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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
DEWOLFE V. RICHMOND
By: A. Lauren Cramer
INDIGENT ARRESTEES HAVE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AT INITIAL APPEARANCES BEFORE DISTRICT
COURT COMMISSIONERS AND BAIL REVIEWS BEFORE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES; TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN ISSUING DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WITHOUT
CONSIDERING OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S
BUDGETARY CONCERNS OR DRAFTING A REMEDY; RES
JUDICATA WOULD NOT PRECLUDE ARRESTEES FROM
SUBSEQUENTLY SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
ENFORCE THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL
All Recent Developments are available on the University of Baltimore
Law Forum website: http://law.ubalt.eduilawforum.
Please cite this Recent Development as DeWolfe v. Richmond, 42 U. BaIt.
L.F. 240 (2012).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
DEWOLFE V. RICHMOND: INDIGENT ARRESTEES HAVE A
STATUTORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT INITIAL
APPEARANCES BEFORE DISTRICT COURT
COMMISSIONERS AND BAIL REVIEWS BEFORE DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES; TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ISSUING
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WITHOUT CONSIDERING
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S BUDGETARY
CONCERNS OR DRAFTING A REMEDY; RES JUDICATA
WOULD NOT PRECLUDE ARRESTEES FROM
SUBSEQUENTLY SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
ENFORCE THEIR RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
By: A. Lauren Cramer
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that indigent criminal
defendants are entitled to appointed counsel, under Maryland’s Public
Defender Act (“PD Act”), during initial bail hearings before district
court commissioners and during bail reviews before district court
judges. DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, 2012 WL 10853 (Md. Jan. 4,
2012). The court further held that the trial court did not err in entering
declaratory judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs without also
generating a remedy for the Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”).
Id. at *14-15. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs could seek
injunctive relief to enforce their right to counsel. Id. at *16-18.
This class action proceeding involved eleven named plaintiffs,
including Quinton Richmond (“Richmond”), each of whom was
arrested for a “serious offense,” per section 16-101(h)(1)-(4) of the
Public Defender Statute. Each arrestee was detained at the Central
Booking Jail and subsequently brought before a Baltimore City district
court commissioner to determine their eligibility for pretrial release.
During those hearings, each individual informed the commissioner of
their inability to afford an attorney, and requested an appointed
attorney. In each instance, the commissioner denied appointed
counsel and set bail. Richmond and the other arrestees subsequently
filed their class action suit against numerous defendants, including the
District Court of Maryland and its Chief Judge, the Administrative
Judge of the District Court for Baltimore City, and the Commissioners
of the District Court in Baltimore City. The basis of the lawsuit was to
obtain a declaratory judgment ruling that bail hearings are part of the
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criminal proceeding, entitling arrestees to legal representation during
those hearings under the PD Act, the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. They also sought a declaratory judgment ruling that the initial
bail hearings implicated their fundamental rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Further, Richmond also sought an injunction enjoining the defendants
from future violations of this right to representation by the OPD.
Richmond initially filed the lawsuit in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, where the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. Richmond subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland then issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative and
vacated the order of the circuit court, remanding the case with
instructions to dismiss unless Richmond amended the complaint to
reflect the proper defendants, including the Public Defender
(“DeWolfe”). Richmond amended the complaint, and the circuit court
granted judgment to Richmond, but did not decide the issues of
declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also issued an order
staying the decision during the pendency of an appeal; both parties
then filed timely appeals. Richmond later filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari seeking review of the case by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, which the court granted prior to any review by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed how the right to
counsel under the PD Act is broader in scope than the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *7 (citing McCarter v. State, 363 Md.
705, 707, 770 A.2d 195, 199-200 (2001)). In section 16-204(b)(2) of
the PD Act, it states that legal representation is to be provided at all
stages of a proceeding, which in the criminal context includes custody,
interrogation, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, and appeal.
DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *9. Richmond highlighted this
subsection, and the court agreed that the plain language in the statute
includes bail hearings, and thus, criminal defendants have the right to
counsel during such proceedings. Id. The court also held that an
initial appearance before a commissioner is undoubtedly contained
within the criminal proceeding, and is accordingly a stage in that
proceeding due to its nature and overall importance. Id. at *11 (citing
McCarter v. State, 363 Md. 705, 707, 770 A.2d 195, 196 (2001)).
Even in situations where indigent defendants are charged with a less
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serious offense or other proceedings not included under the PD Act,
the court further emphasized that such arrestees are nevertheless
entitled to legal representation since incarceration could result from
those hearings as well. DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *11-12 (citing
State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 697, 694 A.2d 462, 463-464 (1997)).
The court further extended this statutory right to counsel to bail
reviews held in district courts before judges. DeWolfe, 2012 WL
10853 at *12.
The court then considered whether the trial court erred in granting
declaratory judgment without also crafting a remedy to execute the
ruling. DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853 at *14-15. The court stated that the
central question regarding declaratory judgments is whether such a
judgment would terminate the controversy, and whether actual,
concrete, and adverse claims or interests exist. Id. at *14 (citing
Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 408 Md. 242, 256, 969
A.2d 284, 292 (2009)). A declaratory judgment might be appropriate
even if a party may incur a consequential burden, particularly under
such circumstances as here, where the statutory right to counsel was at
issue in a class action suit. DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *14. In
reviewing past precedent, the court did not find any occasion where it
delayed implementation of a substantive right due to concerns for the
financial costs attendant to carrying out that right. Id. at *15. The
court further stated that the budgetary concerns of the OPD have never
played a role in decisions involving the statutory right to counsel. Id.
at *14 (citing Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 623, 474 A.2d 1305,
1327 (1984)).
Finally, the court addressed whether the circuit court’s denial of
Richmond’s request for injunctive relief raised a res judicata bar,
preventing arrestees from seeking injunctive relief for future
violations. DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *16. Res judicata bars a
claim only when three requirements are present. Id. at *17. The
parties in the subsequent litigation must be the same as, or in privity
with, the parties to the earlier dispute, the subsequent action must
present matters that were, or could have been, litigated in the earlier
action, and there must be a valid final judgment on the merits in the
earlier dispute. Id. Applying those criteria to the present case, the
court held that the second and third elements were not satisfied to
invoke a res judicata bar. Id. Future violations of the declaratory
judgment could not have been litigated in the earlier action and the
denial of injunctive relief was a procedural decision, rather than one
on the merits, because the circuit court stayed its decision, pending
appellate review. Id. Overall, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
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agreed with Richmond that arrestees enjoy the right to counsel at bail
determinations under the PD Act. Id. at *7.
Alternatively, the dissent emphasized the impractical aspects of this
ruling such as the severely limited resources of the OPD and the
physical composition of the detention facilities in Maryland where
initial appearances take place. DeWolfe, 2012 WL 10853, at *18-19
(Harrell, J. dissenting). The dissent argued that a stay should have
been part of the holding in order to accommodate the monetary and
staffing issues related to its implementation. Id.
DeWolfe v. Richmond extends the rights of indigent criminal
defendants, which increases their likelihood of being well-prepared for
bail review determinations and may ultimately help arrestees reach
more favorable and legally competent outcomes in their cases. With
the assistance of counsel arrestees will be able to more fully articulate
why, based on the statutory criteria, they are entitled to a bail or a
lower bail.
However, as the dissent emphasizes, this holding will place an
enormous burden on the already overburdened OPD. The budgetary
concerns are significant, with the cost of a much larger caseload
estimated to be impractically high, calling for more staffing and longer
hours spent on these types of cases. Public defenders may need to
work night shifts at pretrial detention centers or courthouses in order
to accommodate this ruling and the Office of the State’s Attorney may
be interested in sending prosecutors to represent the State at these
hearings as well.
The ruling in this case presents a dichotomy between increasing the
rights of the accused and the ability to support those rights monetarily.
The balance between these two issues will need to be resolved before
this ruling may be fully implemented. Recently, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland issued a two-week stay shortly after announcing this
decision, and the Maryland General Assembly subsequently passed
bills to amend the PD Act to counteract this ruling. The bills, which
are awaiting the Governor’s signature, state that the right to counsel
under the PD Act would exist only when a defendant seeks a bail
review before a Maryland district court judge and not during initial
appearances before commissioners.

